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I. Carnap on the meaning of probability statements 
 
For the sake of my argument, imagine, for a moment, that a successful 
bomb attack against a London tube station has taken place and that, as a 
result, a significant number of people died or were injured. Now suppose 
that not long after the attack, the police, following what they considered to 
be an important lead, arrested a man - let us call him Q.  The police 
suspected that Q belonged to an important terrorist organization, which 
they thought to have planned the strike. This organization, the police have 
found out, had a peculiar way of selecting the perpetrators of its attacks, 
namely, the following. First, the leaders would decide in a central committee 
meeting to undertake a specific action. However, they would not then 
choose who would perform it. The organization would keep permanently 
100 of its best members in a stand-by status. But only at the very last minute 
one of them would be chosen to deliver the blow. This choice would then be 
accomplished by means of a draw from a lottery wheel. 
 The draw would be set out in motion in the following way. 
 Each and every one of the previously designed 100 men would be 
ascribed one number between 1 and 100 by a randomized computer 
program and no number would be ascribed to more than one man. The 
lottery wheel would contain 100 balls, each of them marked with a number 
between 1 and 100. 
 No two balls would have the same number. After an appropriate time 
of spinning, one of these balls would be extracted from the wheel. The man 
to whom the computer would have ascribed the number marked in the ball 
would then deliver the planned action. In the case of the attack to the 
London tube station, Q was the man indicated by the organization’s lottery 
system to perform it, or so the police thought.  
Eventually, Q was charged with having perpetrated the attack and 
was brought to court. 
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 In the course of the trial, he acknowledged both being a member of 
the terrorist organization in question and having been one of the 100 
operatives it had kept in a stand-by status prior to the attack. However, and 
in spite of the evidence the prosecution presented against him, he denied 
having been the bomber in this case. Thus, it was up for the jury to issue a 
verdict concerning his guilt. Obviously, no member of the jury had had any 
previous contact with Q, or the terrorist organization he admitted belonging 
to. Having been instructed to deliver the verdict ‘guilty’ if and only if such a 
verdict had been established ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’, what the jury 
had to decide was whether the probability that Q had been the material 
author of the bombing was high enough to justify his conviction.  
Q’s lawyer pleaded that, given Q’s confession that he had been one of 
the 100 operatives kept in a stand-by status by the terrorist organization 
prior to the strike, and given the absolute ignorance the police showed 
concerning the results of the draw from the lottery wheel, the only objective 
fact concerning his guilt was that the probability of his having been the 
perpetrator of the attack was very low, namely, of only 1%.  
This, of course, meant that the probability of his not having been the 
perpetrator of the attack was much higher, namely, of 99%. 
 Under such circumstances, so the lawyer argued, no jury could 
possibly find a defendant guilty ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’. 
 Therefore, Q should be acquitted.  
The prosecution pleaded that, although nobody actually saw Q 
detonating the bomb, the police were able both to collect credible testimonial 
reports placing Q at the crime scene immediately before the blast and to find 
traces indicating that Q had handled the explosive materials used in the 
bombing. Thus, considered together, the different pieces of evidence made 
Q’s guilt highly likely. 
 Therefore, Q should be convicted. After lengthy and careful 
deliberation, in which both the evidence put forth to the court by the 
prosecution and the arguments produced by the defence were carefully 
scrutinized, the jury ended up issuing a guilty verdict against Q.  
Thus, this verdict was reached despite the fact that, given the details 
of the police report concerning the decision procedures followed by the 
terrorist organisation Q acknowledged belonging to, every member of the 
jury accepted Q’s lawyer argument that the probability Q had had of being 
the perpetrator of the attack was extremely low, namely, of only 1%, and 
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therefore the probability he had had of not having been the perpetrator was 
overwhelmingly superior, namely, of 99%. How then is it possible to 
conceive that one man might have been considered by a group of other 
reasonable men to be guilty, beyond any reasonable doubt, of having 
performed a deed, when the probability of his having done it was of only 
1%? 
 Finding an answer to this question is what makes this story 
interesting for my purposes here.  
Intuitively, an appropriate way to solve this problem and thus to 
understand why the decision of the jury was in favour of the prosecution 
rather than in favour of the defence is to claim that one and the same event – 
Q’s perpetrating a bomb attack to a tube station in London – was actually 
the focus of two completely different assessments of probability. And that 
each of these assessments resulted, in turn, from the triggering of a distinct 
concept associated with the use of the word ‘probability’.  
One of these concepts is concerned with the objective chance Q had, 
prior to the draw, of being chosen to be the bomber, given his position in the 
organization as an operative in stand-by status and the lottery system 
followed in choosing the perpetrator of each attack; the other concept is 
concerned with the extent to which the evidence collected by the police after 
the blast made probable the thesis that Q had been the actual bomber.  
The former probability concept seems to apply to objective facts in the 
empirical world, namely, facts about the extraction of balls spinning around 
in lottery wheels; as such, this concept seems to apply to something which is 
wholly independent from any sort of evidence which may have been 
gathered in the course of the police investigation. The latter probability 
concept, however, seems to be measuring the extent to which a particular 
theory is confirmed by the evidence produced in its support. In the case at 
hand, it seems to be measuring the extent to which the theory devised by the 
prosecution in order to explain how the bombing came about was confirmed 
by the evidence put forth before the court. Therefore, such a concept seems 
to apply to theories about the world rather than to the world itself; as such, it 
is relative to the particular evidence gathered in support of the theory or 
hypothesis it is classifying. 
Thus, the members of the jury thought it was their job to assess 
whether the theory put forth by the prosecution was indeed highly 
confirmed by the evidence brought before them and their assessment was 
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that it indeed was. And, in order to reach that decision, the probability 
indicated by Q’s lawyer regarding the unlikelihood of his being chosen to be 
the bomber by the organization he belonged to could simply be ignored. As 
a matter of fact, any one of the 100 operatives would have had the same 
probability of 1% of having been chosen to be the bomber. So, in this respect, 
there was no difference between Q and any of the other 99 operatives of the 
organization who had been in a stand-by status previous to the draw. 
 Granting that the terrorist organization Q confessed belonging to 
indeed ordered the attack, whoever had actually perpetrated it had had a 
probability of 1% of becoming the bomber. However, given the crime scene 
evidence and the testimonial reports collected by the police, the probability 
that Q had been the perpetrator of the attack was much higher than the 
probability that anybody else had played that role. 
 Therefore, the latter probability was the appropriate one to be taken 
into consideration by the jury, as it actually was.   
This solution to the problem of how to understand the way this 
imaginary jury handled its task is similar to the one Carnap put forth in his 
famous book Logical Foundations of Probability (1950), in order to account for 
the way different probability statements should be analysed. There, he 
presented a proposal according to which it is possible to extract two 
different concepts of probability from the fuzzy conceptual structure of pre-
scientific thinking. One of these concepts of probability is best captured by 
its scientific explication in terms of the logical-semantic idea of the degree of 
confirmation of a hypothesis with respect to the set of sentences describing 
the evidence. Carnap labelled this concept ‘Probability1’. 
 Probability1 corresponds to the concept of probability involved in the 
jury’s deliberation concerning Q’s guilt. This is a concept of probability 
usually called ‘epistemic’.  
The other concept of probability Carnap thought possible to identify 
in pre-scientific thinking is best captured by its scientific explication in terms 
of the empirical idea of the relative frequency of an event with respect to a 
long sequence of instances of the mass phenomenon in which it takes place. 
Carnap labelled this concept ‘Probability2’. Probability2 corresponds to the 
concept of probability involved in determining the probability Q had of 
having been chosen to be the perpetrator of the attack by the organization he 
belonged to, given the choice procedure that was in place. This is a concept 
of probability usually called ‘empirical’.  
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According to Carnap, both Probability1 and Probability2 are 
legitimate scientific concepts. Therefore, the development of the scientific 
approach to probability ended up preserving and belabouring the pre-
scientific distinction in meaning already present in the original uses of 
probability terms in ordinary language. The upshot of Carnap´s thesis is that 
philosophical discussions about the appropriate analysis of the meaning of 
probability statements are pointless and should be discarded.  
 
II. Toulmin on the meaning of probability statements 
 
In the essay “Probability”, the second in his collection The Uses of 
Argument (1958), published almost a decade after Carnap’s Logical 
Foundations, Toulmin agreed with Carnap that it was indeed a mistake to 
look for a single unified reference in terms of which all the uses of the term 
‘probability’ could be accounted for. 
 However, he also maintained that it was equally senseless to try to 
correct this mistake by appealing to the idea of there being two (or more) 
different references associated with the appropriate uses of this term rather 
than one.  
 How can these remarks be made to be compatible with each other? 
 How can you agree that it is wrong to look for a single reference to 
account for different uses of a term and, at the same time, contend that it is 
equally wrong to suggest that there is a plurality of such references?  
In order to try to understand how Toulmin answered this question, 
we have to know something more about the way he thought we should 
understand how the term ‘probable’ and its cognates are actually used in 
ordinary language sentences of probability ascription. 
 His view in this respect was that such terms are modal modifiers that 
modulate the force with which a speaker is disposed to assert or to assent to 
the statement or proposition he attaches to them. Qua modal modifiers, 
belonging to the same family of words as e.g., ‘possibly’, the use of such 
terms would not impinge on the meaning of the statements or propositions to 
which they were attached.  
On the other hand, and still according to Toulmin, the force associated 
with an act of assertion or with an act of assent was supposed to be an 
indicator of the speaker’s conviction, or the lack of it, regarding the truth of 
the sentence asserted or assented to in that act. 
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 Therefore, Toulmin viewed the use of a probability term to introduce 
a sentence as the use of a linguistic device the purpose of which was to 
indicate the intensity of the speaker’s conviction or confidence, or the lack of it, 
in the truth of a sentence or phrase.  
However, despite having established such an intimate connection 
between our use of probability terms and the intensity of psychological 
aspects, such as confidence or conviction, Toulmin did not altogether sever 
the ties linking sentences of probability ascription with the traditional 
definitions of probability. Actually, he maintained that, by helping 
expressing our conviction or confidence in the truth of a sentence or phrase, 
our uses of probability terms and its cognates were also connected, not only 
with frequencies in the long run, but also with support or confirmation 
relations, as well as with other traditional forms of defining probability not 
favoured by Carnap, such as Laplace’s classical ratios of favourable cases to 
the total number of cases.  
This contention needs clarification. It certainly is not obvious how 
some or all of these connections could be simultaneously present in the 
occasions of use of probability terms. Toulmin’s idea in this respect seems to 
be the following. Feelings of confidence or conviction in the truth of a 
sentence do not simply exist in a speaker. They respond to something. More 
in particular, they are supposed to co-vary with the quality of the evidence 
backing the utterance of that sentence. 
 And, according to Toulmin, frequencies, evidential support, or the 
ratio of the favourable cases to the total number of cases, as it may be fit to 
the nature of the case, rather than defining a putative independent concept 
of probability, constitute precisely the relevant types of evidence that 
typically back the way we formulate our judgments in which probability 
terms occur.  
By providing evidence concerning the truth of the sentences 
probability-terms classify, and thus by co-varying with the confidence or 
conviction with which such sentences are asserted or assented to by a 
speaker, support relations, ratios or frequencies in the long run also provide, 
according to Toulmin, a means of measuring such conviction or confidence 
the agents have in the sentences in question. Thus, what is measured by such 
measurements is not the magnitude of some independent entity belonging 
either to the objective world of physical facts or to the abstract world of 
logical relations. 
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 A fortiori it is not the sort of entity Carnap might want to call 
‘probability’ and that he might want to define in terms of either the concepts 
of Probability1 or of Probability2.  
Toulmin’s two remarks above can then be made compatible with each 
other by means of the introduction of the idea that the use of probability 
terms in sentences of probability ascription has a non-referential character. 
 And indeed the upshot of his essay was that the term ‘probability’ 
and its cognates had a single, undivided, non-referential meaning in 
ordinary language, and that any proper account of the ‘scientific’ concept of 
probability would have to depart from a correct understanding of that 
meaning. Therefore, from his perspective, the pointlessness of the 
philosophical discussions Carnap talked about was real; it had, however, a 
different and deeper source than the one the latter diagnosed.  
 
III. Toulmin and the subjective view of probability 
 
Toulmin’s ideas concerning how our use of probability-terms may 
contribute to help measuring an agent’s conviction or confidence, or the lack 
of it, in the truth of a sentence establish a clear link between his account of 
probability and the so-called ‘subjectivist’ approach to this topic. I think that 
the understanding of the nature of such a link will be instrumental in 
revealing the extent to which Toulmin’s standpoint departs from Carnap’s. 
 As a matter of fact, and as is widely known, the latter refused to 
acknowledge any credibility to the subjectivist approach to probability until 
very late in his life. 
 However Toulmin’s approach and the subjectivist one, although 
closely connected, are not congruent. Let us then see more in detail how 
these two standpoints differ and what is common to both. 
According to the subjectivist view, a sentence of probability ascription 
is a measurement of someone’s degree of belief in a certain sentence p. 
 Typically, such measurements are to be viewed as being made from 
the third person perspective. It is the observer that ascribes a probability 
measure to the subject’s degree of belief in the truth of a certain sentence p 
based on the odds at which he finds out the subject will be disposed to bet 
on the truth of p. It is certainly true that, as some authors remark, as soon as 
he becomes familiar with the procedure, the subject himself may decide to 
internalize the observer’s role and to place himself in his imagination in a 
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betting situation in order to figure out the odds at which he would be 
disposed to bet on the truth of any sentence he might envisage. But the fact 
that such a procedure might be possible does nothing to change the essence 
of the matter. The only thing it shows is that the subjectivist standpoint 
assumes that the subject does not need to know anything relevant about his 
dispositions to accept bets prior to his involvement in the betting procedure, 
be it an explicit one, elicited from the outside, or an introspective version of 
the former, staged only in his own imagination.  
Be this as it may, sentences of probability ascription, in this sense, do 
not somehow classify the aspects of the world referred to by the 
complements of the ascription-sentences. They are sentences about the (not 
necessarily conscious) cognitive life of agents. As such, they are tools of 
behavioural and psychological inquiry and belong from the outset to the 
world of scientific theorizing. This being the case, it becomes clear why it is 
that, for a subjectivist, and contrary to Toulmin’s view, it makes no sense to 
claim that the use of a probability term in a sentence of probability ascription 
might be regarded as being somehow similar to the use of a verbal 
replacement or, maybe better put, of a verbal way of strengthening those 
elements of an expression of conviction that are usually displayed simply in 
terms of the tone of voice with which the sentence is stated and/or the bodily 
expression accompanying such an expression. Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that Toulmin and the subjectivists are in a clear disagreement 
concerning the way one should interpret the meaning of sentences of 
probability ascription.  
But, in reality, this conclusion does not follow. In fact, appearances 
notwithstanding, when Toulmin talks about the meaning of sentences of 
probability ascription and when the subjectivists talk about the meaning of 
sentences of probability ascription they are not talking about the meaning of 
the same kind of sentences. That is, instead of disagreeing about how to 
interpret the meaning of a previously identified set of sentences, what they 
are doing is actually putting forth different views concerning the meaning of 
different sets of sentences.  
In order to try to clarify this point, I think it might be useful to recall 
at this stage some important remarks made by Wittgenstein in his mature 
philosophy of mind. The remarks I am thinking about are those he made 
concerning the semantics of first-person sentences of inner experience of the 
kind of ‘I’m in pain’ as opposed to the semantics of third-person sentences of 
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ascription of inner experience, such as, e.g., ‘He’s in pain’. According to 
these remarks, whereas the former sentences should be regarded simply as 
expressions of pain, similar in that respect to more elaborate forms of 
moaning or crying, the latter should be regarded as genuine declarative 
sentences by means of which actual cognitive assessments of states of affairs 
in the external world could be performed. 
 As is well known, Wittgenstein brought back the origin of the 
conceptual confusions he considered western philosophers became 
systematically entangled in concerning the foundation of our knowledge of 
the external world to their inability to perceive correctly this important 
semantic distinction and thus to their insistence in treating first-person 
sentences of inner experience as if they were the result of a process of 
knowledge acquisition. This is, however, a story we do not need enter into 
right now.  
Wittgenstein’s semantic diagnosis does not imply that I-sentences of 
inner experience may not be cognitively useful. 
 Obviously, the sufferer’s use of the sentence ‘I’m in pain’ in order to 
express his pain constitutes, even when one assumes the correctness of 
Wittgenstein’s analysis, a reliable indicator of his suffering to the external 
observer. Thus, although not endowed with a cognitive nature per se, the 
production of such sentences, under the relevant circumstances, provides an 
appropriate behavioural basis for the justification of ascriptions of pain to 
the sufferer by an observer and even for the production by the latter of 
sentences measuring the intensity of such suffering.  
Now, the sentences Toulmin analyses in detail in his essay are 
ordinary language sentences in which ‘probably’ and similar terms occur; 
with respect to these, he convincingly claims that the point of their use is to 
express conviction or confidence, or the lack of them, not to describe anything 
concerning the inner cognitive life of the speaker. 
 Subjectivists, on the other hand, associate, as mentioned above, 
sentences of probability ascription with sentences reporting the result of 
elaborate psychological experiments; and convincingly claim that these 
sentences have a clearly referential use, the reference of which is the degree 





Our common way of using ‘probable’ and its cognates in ordinary 
language sentences of probability ascription is, however, a wholly different 
game than the one they are interested in; it is, moreover, a game the 
subjectivists may legitimately consider not to be their business to address.  
Clearly, Toulmin’s view regarding the semantics underlying our use 
of probability terms in ordinary language sentences of probability ascription 
is similar to Wittgenstein’s view regarding the semantics of I-sentences of 
inner experience (the probability terms featuring in them express; they do not 
refer). From this semantic peculiarity, it follows, according to Toulmin’s 
standpoint, that those guarded assertions we make by associating a sentence 
with a probability qualifier are about the world and not about our feelings of 
conviction or confidence in the truth of the sentence we are thereby 
asserting. That is, by means of such sentences we express the latter, but the 
sentences themselves are about the former. 
 By contrast, according to the subjectivist view, sentences of 
probability ascription are, as mentioned above, about the strength of an 
agent’s beliefs concerning whatever such beliefs are about and not about the 
object of those beliefs. They are, therefore, similar to third-person sentences 
of ascription of inner experience, according to Wittgenstein’s analysis. 
 Obviously, two parties are not (necessarily) disagreeing by 
presenting different descriptions of the meaning of different sets of 
sentences.  
Once the initial impression that they might be talking about the same 
kind of sentences reveals itself to be an illusion, the ground becomes clear 
for us to realize that, besides having different foci of theoretical interest, the 
two standpoints do actually have something important in common. What 
this point in common is can be made clear by the following pair of remarks.  
For a subjectivist, the use by an agent of a token of the kind of 
ordinary language sentences containing probability terms Toulmin analysed 
may perfectly well be taken by the external observer to be an indicator of the 
value of the agent’s degree of belief concerning the truth of the complement 
sentence referring the aspect of the world it is about, even if, as Toulmin 
claims, the original complete sentence of our ordinary language does not 
refer to such a belief. That is, just as the utterance of I-sentences of inner 
experience by an agent provides evidence in terms of which the ascription of 
third-person psychological sentences about that agent by an observer might 
be justified, the utterance of one ordinary language sentence of probability 
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ascription by a speaker can function as evidence in terms of which a tentative 
ascription of an approximate degree of belief to such a speaker might be 
justified. Obviously, from the subjectivist standpoint, a proper, reliable, 
ascription of a quantified degree of belief to that speaker would need to be 
made later based on a properly set sequence of betting procedures.  
Similarly, I see no reason why Toulmin could not accept that a branch 
of psychological theorizing might specialize in measuring quantitatively the 
conviction or confidence agents have on the truth of sentences, and produce 
other sentences containing the outcome of such measurements, as long as 
the practitioners of that branch of knowledge would not contend, as they do 
not, that such measurements were to be made in terms of a semantic 
interpretation of the sentences of our ordinary language containing 
probability terms.  
There is, as a matter of fact, an obvious link between degree of belief, 
on the one hand, and conviction, or confidence, on the other hand, namely, 
the following: the bigger the former is, the higher the latter is, and the lower 
the former is, the lower the latter is. 
 Given the fact that, as has been showed by a number of different 
authors, the quantitative measuring of degrees of belief by means of betting 
procedures, as long as it is supplemented with an assumption of coherence, 
satisfies the axioms of probability theory, there seems to be no reason why a 
defender of Toulmin’s standpoint should not accept the cogency of the use 
of the concept of subjective probability in order to measure quantitatively an 
agent’s confidence in the truth of a proposition as it is expressed in, inter alia, 
ordinary language sentences of probability ascription.  
This is all the more important because our confidence in the truth of a 
certain sentence does not need to be based on the knowledge of the relevant 
evidence concerning frequencies or the ratio of favourable cases to the total 
number of cases. Similarly, our conviction that a certain sentence is not true 
does not need to be based on the lack of knowledge of the relevant evidence. 
 People do have hunches, prejudices, and unexplained convictions. 
 Therefore, pace Toulmin, the conviction one has is not always the 
conviction one is entitled to have given the evidence one has. Not even 
Toulmin would deny, I suppose, that it would be foolish to sustain that the 
poor evidence an agent has concerning the truth of a sentence could be 
unguardedly used in order to provide an approximate measure of the 
intensity of his conviction in its truth in cases in which he expresses a 
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guarded but nevertheless high degree of confidence in such truth by means 
of its inclusion in a sentence of probability ascription. Thus, the introduction 
of betting procedures as a means of measuring degree of belief, and, 
therefore, conviction, or the lack of it, in the truth of a proposition, 
independently of the evidence the agent may have gathered concerning such 
truth, does seem to be an important source of psychological realism 
introduced in the field of action-explanation by subjectivists.  
To sum up, despite their disagreements in other respects, both 
Toulmin and the subjectivists claim that probability is linked with an agent’s 
psychological state, namely, confidence, conviction or degree of belief in the 
truth of a sentence, and not with whatever entities, abstract or concrete, 
might exist in the world outside of the subject. 
 They are in this respect clearly together and in clear opposition to 
Carnap. 
 
IV. Carnap, Toulmin and Folk-Probability 
 
I am in favour of dualism in matters of philosophy of probability. My 
view differs from Carnap’s however. Like him, I think that chances, 
understood as that which is measured by an empirical-objective concept of 
probability, exist “out there” in the world, and are fully independent of us. 
 By this I mean that the actual value of such probabilities depends 
neither on the evidence we happen to have gathered, nor on any agent’s or 
community of agent’s degrees of belief in the truth of any sentence or 
proposition referring to a relevant aspect of the world. Unlike him, I think 
that degrees of belief of an agent in the truth of a sentence or proposition are 
also appropriately measured by a probability concept. Moreover, I follow 
the subjectivist view in equating epistemic probability with justified degree 
of belief. Thus, I do not accept the Carnapian doctrine according to which 
epistemic probability marks out an independent concept of probability.  
But this talk is not about my views on what is the right way of carving 
out the outlines of a scientific concept of probability. It is about what, 
borrowing an expression from contemporary philosophy of mind, one might 
term ‘folk-probability’. As mentioned above, Carnap claimed, in this respect, 
that a pre-scientific concept of probability of an empirical-objective nature 
exists in people’s minds prior to its formalization in scientific thought. The 
question I want to address now is the following.  
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Is Toulmin actually right in his contention that this Carnapian idea is 
bogus? Not that this question would matter much to Carnap. He did not 
picture himself as being involved in the writing of a sort of History of the 
Development of the Concept of Probability in the Human Mind, when he wrote 
his introduction to the Logical Foundations of Probability. Presumably, he 
would accept with no particular qualms a charge of the historical-
psychological falsity of his story made by a specialist in conceptual History, 
as long as such a story would help him fulfil his actual purpose of 
conceptual clarification of the two concepts of scientific probability he 
considered there to be. But even if it did not matter much to Carnap, it 
mattered to Toulmin, and it matters to me.  
On what grounds are we to adjudicate the dispute between Toulmin 
and Carnap then? On the one hand, the distinction Toulmin draws between 
the force of the modal term ‘probably’ and the criteria for its use sheds some 
light into the way we do use some sentences of our ordinary language. On 
the other hand, it is hard to accept that nothing substantial is being dealt 
with in the debate around the question of how best to interpret our 
unanalysed notions of probability.  
The strategy followed by Toulmin to deal with this issue is to bring 
back the study of what non-formal probability might be to an analysis of the 
meaning of ordinary language sentences of probability ascription. The 
principle underlying the use of such a strategy seems to be the principle that, 
whatever a pre-scientific concept of something might amount to, our only 
clue to determine its content is the analysis of the way normal agents use the 
sentences of ordinary language carrying the term allegedly referring to it in 
their relevant contexts. Indeed, it was Toulmin himself who ascribed to the 
essay “Probability” the status of a “pilot investigation” introducing ideas 
and distinctions that throw “a general light on the categories of rational 
assessment”. These words indicate clearly that he took such a principle to be 
of a general scope and thus that it ought to be applied to different categories 
used in the rational assessment of arguments. 
 However, it seems to me that, even if we grant Toulmin that he is 
right in his analysis of the semantics of many of our ordinary language 
sentences of probability ascription, there are other sources of information 
concerning the lines that mark out the categories belonging to our pre-
scientific or non-scientific thinking that he neglects. Prominent among these 
is, I think, empirical psychological research.  
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I suppose Toulmin would reply to such a charge of negligence with 
the claim that his purpose was critical rather than descriptive. 
 Nevertheless, it is hard to see how he thinks he can avoid 
psychological research, given the fact that he also claims, against 
mainstream logicist theories of argument assessment, that the critical 
understanding of the criteria of argument assessment he wants to reach 
should be grounded in our actual practices and concepts. But, surely, 
alongside with the semantics of ordinary language sentences, empirical 
psychological research has also relevant things to say on what the content of 
our non-formal concepts is. I suppose one would have to be a strenuous 
defender of some strong version of the Sapir-Whorf thesis in order to deny 
this. That is certainly not my case. 
Indeed, there are many studies in the psychology of probability that 
are of importance to philosophers. Among these, I would like to highlight, 
on the one hand, those that study practices people get involved into that 
seem to show that something like a concept of probability is present in the 
background of their activity, irrespective of the language they use in 
association with it (betting is precisely a case in point), and, on the other 
hand, those that study the way people respond to explicit tasks and 
questionnaires that test the way they conceptualize problems in which the 
notion of probability seems to be implicitly involved. I am convinced that 
the results produced by these studies do need to be taken into account if a 
“true-to-life” analysis of probability arguments is to be made, as Toulmin 
intended. I command no comprehensive knowledge of this literature. I 
looked into some studies of the latter kind though. And I did not find the 
information they provided to be negligible for the participants in a debate on 
argumentation theory. Let me present to you some important results I 
gathered from them.  
The one that stood out the most was the result that subjects 
themselves claim having some kind of a spontaneous notion of probability. 
This result was certainly not obvious from the outset and I do not think it 
should be discarded as being of a merely ‘verbal’ origin. Moreover, still 
according to such results, this concept tends to be described as serving the 
purpose of measuring something else; whatever this something else might 
be is most frequently called either ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’. 
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 Of course, these two results, by themselves, are not particularly 
illuminating until one is presented with further results concerning what it is 
that these subjects call ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’. Therefore, I looked into that 
too.  
I made a list of six different responses subjects were reported as 
having given concerning what it was that they associated with the terms 
‘chance’ or ‘randomness’. The list is the following. A first group of responses 
associated these terms with whatever it is that ‘we did not predict’. A second 
group with ‘what is unpredictable’. A third group with ‘what is done 
without reflection’. A fourth group with ‘what is uncaused’. A fifth group 
with ‘what we cannot control’. 
 And the sixth and last group associated ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’ 
with  ‘coincidences‘. We find here connections with an objectivist view of 
probability (e.g., ‘what is uncaused’), with a subjectivist view (e.g., ‘what we 
did not predict’), and also inconclusive answers (e.g., ‘what we cannot 
control’). So, the list, by itself, is not revealing as to the nature of this 
hypothetical folk-concept. However, it becomes more revealing when it is 
associated with the following two further results I also came across.  
The first is that almost always each subject gives more than one of 
these responses, depending on the nature of the situation he envisages 
involving what he calls ‘randomness’ or ‘chance’. That is, it is in general not 
the case that subjects give only one response of a single nature and stick by 
it. The second is that, when different subjects are placed before a series of 
sentences, each of them describing events connected with some of the above 
given definitions, and are asked to group them according to their similarity, 
the result is almost always the same: the sentences are divided into two large 
groups – the group of the sentences referring to isolated events (an 
unexpected meeting with a friend in the street, the fall of a tile from a roof 
on the head of a passer by, etc.) and the group of the sentences referring to 
repeatable processes or events (a ball exhibiting a particular number 
withdrawn from a lottery wheel, a throw of the dice, a coin throw, etc.).  
If anything, what the stable constitution of these groups suggests, is 
that, if indeed it makes sense to speak of the existence of intuitive pre-
theoretical notions of probability among unsophisticated subjects, then there 
probably are two such intuitive concepts rather than one in the minds of 
those who associate whatever it is they call ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’ with 
the use of probability terms to measure it.  
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As a matter of fact, if only a single probability term were in use here, 
the stability of this grouping pattern across subjects would have to remain 
unexplained. Thus, I think that the spontaneity and the uniformity of this 
way of grouping these sentences constitute evidence against Toulmin’s 
single-view of probability. On the other hand, and as far as I could see, 
nothing in the inner organization of the group of sentences describing 
isolated events indicates that the probability-judgments measuring the 
degree of ‘randomness’ that is associated with them are portrayed as having 
to be somehow conditionally produced on the available evidence. Thus, the 
lines demarcating these groups do not seem to do justice to the dichotomy 
separating Carnap’s Probability1 and Probability2 concepts.  
This does not mean, however, that these lines are necessarily closer to 
the dichotomy separating subjective from empirical-objective views on 
probability. As a matter of fact, there is no indication that the sort of chance 
or randomness subjects associate with sentences describing these events is 
somehow dependent upon their putative degrees of belief concerning the 
truth of the sentences describing them rather than with the events 
themselves, although the former dependence is indeed a possible way of 
rationalizing their response. It is important to recall here that there are other 
studies in the psychology of probability consistently showing that people 
seem to experience troubles respecting the assumption of coherence. And it 
remains to be seen whether or not it is possible to make sense of a concept of 
quantitative degrees of belief defined independently of this assumption. 
 Thus, according to these data, at least, it is not clear how one might 
classify the sort of probability concept, assuming there is one, people 
associate with the randomness they seem to consider to be characteristic of 
single events of the above-mentioned kind.  
Be this as it may, these data appear to justify Carnap’s thesis 
according to which there really is an intuitive folk-concept of objective 
probability associated with repeatable events. 
Of course, by themselves, the data do not allow us to discriminate 
between Carnap’s own frequentist view of empirical-objective probability 
(Probability2) and the classical Laplacian view of ratios of favourable cases 
to the total number of cases. But this is presumably consistent with the fuzzy 
nature of folk-concepts.  
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Obviously, results like these are just a drop in the ocean of 
psychological research on probability. I do not know how well they 
generalize beyond the samples that were tested. 
 So, it is advisable to refrain from sweeping generalizations. 
 Presumably, they are also compatible with interpretations that differ 
from mine. But I do not think that my interpretation of them is inconsistent, 
or that it peruses data beyond what is reasonable to squeeze out of them. 
Most importantly, however, I think these results show that the studies 
that produced them, together with a myriad of similar studies, provide 
relevant information concerning the content of the folk-notions in use in 
practical argument assessment; and that no responsible debate on non-
formal argumentation theory can afford to ignore such information in the 
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